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Are Proposed African Monetary Unions Optimal Currency Areas? Real 
and Monetary Policy Convergence Analysis
Abstract
A  spectre  is  hunting  embryonic  African  monetary  zones:  the  EMU  crisis.  The 
introduction of common currencies in  West and East Africa is facing stiff challenges in the 
timing of monetary convergence, the imperative of bankers to apply common modeling and 
forecasting methods of monetary policy transmission, as well as the requirements of common 
structural and institutional characteristics among candidate states. Inspired by the premise of 
the EMU crisis, this paper assesses real and monetary policy convergence within the proposed 
WAM  and  EAM  zones.  In  the  analysis,  monetary  policy  targets  inflation  and  financial 
dynamics  of depth,  efficiency,  activity  and size while  real  sector  policy targets  economic 
performance  in  terms  of  GDP  growth  at  macro  and  micro  levels.  Findings  suggest 
overwhelming lack of convergence; an indication that candidate countries still have to work 
towards harmonizing cross-country differences in  fundamental,  structural and institutional 
characteristics that hamper the convergence process.
JEL Classification: F15; F36; F42; O55; P52
Keywords:  Currency Area; Convergence; Policy Coordination; Africa
1. Introduction  
With much attention currently being placed on convergence criteria and preparedness 
of the aspiring member states of  embryonic African Monetary zones, candidate countries of 
the West African Monetary Zone(WAMZ) have twice postponed the take –off for the single 
currency. Bank experts in the up-coming East African Monetary Zone(EAMZ) fear that plans 
for a common currency in 2012 may be too ambitious as central banks in the five countries 
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are given little  time to prepare  for  the  monetary  union.  These  could be  the result  of  the 
European  Monetary  Union(EMU)  crisis  that  has  sent  a  strong  signal  to  other  common 
currency regions on the goal of real and monetary policy convergence. A paramount lesson of 
the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria results from regional arrangements not designed to 
be robust to a  variety of shocks(Willet,  2010; Willett  & Srisorn, 2011). In designing the 
EMU,  institutions’  almost  exclusive  concern  was  placed  on  mitigating  crises  caused  by 
financial sectors. The official stance of the German government today appears to remain that 
failure of these safeguards is the predominant cause of the crisis. A position which can be 
reasonably argued for Greece,  although its  loss of competitiveness has also been a major 
factor. 
Borrowing from AON(2012), today some experts asserts that knowledge is lacking in 
several central banks in the EAMZ to implement reforms needed for a single currency region. 
In a recent meeting, bankers agreed on the need for capacity-building in economic forecasting 
and modeling among staff in order for them to be ready for the upcoming monetary union. A 
report evaluating the capacities of each of the central banks found there were great needs for 
training programs, especially in key modeling and forecasting methods as participants noted 
great gaps in their usage. In an opening statement, Claver Gatete, Deputy Governor of the 
Rwanda  National  Bank  made  it  clear  that  the  importance  of  economic  modeling  and 
forecasting  could  not  be  underestimated1.  In  order  to  ensure  timely  and  effective 
implementation of the road map to a single currency in the WAMZ, the Convergence Council  
has  urged  members  states  to  pursue  appropriate  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  as  well  as 
rigorous  implementation  of  the  structural  and  institutional  policies  under  the  ECOWAS 
Multilateral  Surveillance  Mechanism,  in  order  to  achieve  convergence  and  a  durable 
1 He stressed these were key instruments in monetary policy formulation as well as a way of providing the 
central  bank  with  clear  and  efficient  ways  to  assess  trends  and  developments  in  domestic  and  external  
economies.  “It  is  useful  in  monitoring  where  the  economy  stands  and  how  to  make  short  and  long-term  
projections in order to determine what monetary policy to follow. There is a need for a central bank to have a  
clear understanding of its monetary transmission mechanisms”Gatete(AON,2012).
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monetary union on a sustainable basis. Three issues result from these stylized facts: (1) the 
need for monetary policy convergence; (2) the imperative of bankers to understand modeling 
and forecasting methods in monetary policy transmission and; (3) the requirement of common 
structural and institutional characteristics among members. 
In  this  paper  we  examine  the  three  issues  by  assessing  real  and monetary  policy 
convergence in the  WAM and  EAM zones. This work contributes to the current debate on 
single currency unions by dissecting elements of macroeconomic and monetary policies into 
financial  intermediary  dynamics(of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and  size),  inflation  and 
economic  performance.  In  so  doing,  it  provides  an  in  depth  picture  of  the  state  of 
convergence, the speed of convergence and the time required to achieved full convergence in 
real  and monetary  policies.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  in  the  following  manner. 
Section 2 examines existing literature. Data and methodology are respectively presented and 
discussed in Section 3. Empirical analysis, discussion and policy implications are covered in 
Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.
2. Existing Literature 
2.1 Motivations for convergence in the run-up to a monetary zone 
Putting aside the premise of the EMU crisis highlighted above, the absence of studies 
that focus on financial convergence in the African continent constitute a concrete motivation 
for this paper. Though a number of studies have focused on financial market convergence 
worldwide, the emphasis has often been on developed and the emerging economies of Latin 
America  and  Asia.  Borrowing  from Alagidede(2008),  such  neglect  is  not  unexpected  as 
African  financial  markets  are  viewed  as  too  risky  and  little  developed  in  operating  and 
institutional  environmental  settings.  Political  strife  and economic  instability  have  plagued 
most African countries and continue to pose a significant threat to foreign investments and 
private  capital  flows(Kenyan  post  election  crises  in  2007/2008,  Zimbabwe’s  economic 
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downturn,  Nigeria’s  marred  transition  in  2008,  the  unending  Egyptian  revolution  and 
currently Nigeria’s  fuel subsidy related social unrest and threat of Islamic fundamentalism). 
With  very  few  exceptions(South  Africa),  African  countries  are  yet  to  rise  as  emerging 
economic  powers.  This  might  partly  elucidate  the  relative  lack  of  academic  research  on 
financial convergence in the continent. Nay, in recent years Africa has witnessed significant 
economic  and  financial  developments;  which  has  led  to  growing  initiatives  on  common 
currency unions.  
Single currency unions are expected to provide gains in growth by favoring a breeding 
atmosphere for competition  and efficiency in the banking sector. These gains result from 
price reductions in financial  services which provide direct gains to customers and indirect 
benefits  through  reduction  of  lending  rates  that  favor  investment(Weill,  2009).  Financial 
convergence is crucial in assessing the outcome of deregulation policies aimed at ameliorating 
the performance and efficiency of the financial intermediary sector(Casu & Girardone, 2010). 
Financial theory  considers integrated markets to be relatively more efficient than divergent 
ones.  Thus an integrated  financial  intermediary market  within  a  monetary zone improves 
cross-border  flow  of  funds,  stimulates  trading  volume  which  in-turn  improves  liquidity. 
Integrated banking markets provide investors with the opportunity of efficiently  allocating 
capital to economic operators(Chen et al., 2002). The ensuing effect is lower cost of capital 
for firms and lower transaction cost for investors(Kim et al., 2005). Therefore when banks are 
integrated within a single currency area, there are positive rewards to financial stability as it 
diminishes the probability of asymmetric shocks(Umutlu et al., 2010). Financial stability in-
turn  could  attenuate  the  risk  of  cross-border  financial  contagion(Beine  et  al.,2010)  and 
augment the capacity of economies to absorb shocks(Yu et al., 2010).
The need for convergence in the banking sector within the WAM and  EAM zones 
draws on the tenets of arbitrage and hypothesis proffered by the portfolio theory. Dynamics of 
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financial  intermediation  converge  to  mirror  the  level  of  arbitrage  activity.  When  they 
converge, it implies a common momentum such as arbitrage activity is bringing the markets 
together. This will reduce the potential for making above normal profits through international 
diversification(Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989). In the same spirit, if deterrents  or potential 
barriers generating country risks and exchange rate premiums are absent, the consequence is 
similar  yields  for  financial  assets  of  similar  risk  and  liquidity  regardless  of  locality  and 
nationality(Von  Furstenberg  &  Jeon,  1989).  Hence  the  motivations  for  convergence  in 
banking  markets  has  premises  on  the  literature  of  financial  intermediary  sector 
interdependence and portfolio diversification(Grubel, 1968; Levy & Sarnat, 1970). A great 
chunk  of  these  papers  have  considered  short-term links  of  stock  markets  and  found  the 
presence  of  short-spell  co-movements.  Results  which  have  been  extended  to  long-run 
financial market co-movements(Bessler & Yang, 2003).
As  we  have  seen,  the  financial  system  exerts  a  significant  influence  on  modern 
economic literature debates(Scholtens & Naaborg, 2005). On a first note, the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism’s effectiveness is contingent on the financial system(Bondt,2000). 
Secondly,  it  is  believed  to  affect  channels  through  which  finance  is  tied  to  economic 
growth(Allen & Gale, 2000). Therefore, the financial system interacts with the economy by 
producing  information  ex-ante  about  possible  investments,  monitoring  of  investments, 
allocation  of  capital,  facilitation  of  trade,  diversification  and  management  of  risks, 
mobilization and pooling of savings as well as easing of goods and services(Levine, 2004).
 The above paragraph is important in the context of this paper because it points to how 
and why assessing dynamics within a financial  system could elucidate the three issues we 
highlighted above that resulted from stylized facts. Plainly put, investigating convergence in 
financial  intermediary  dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and  size  within  a  financial 
system on the one hand and calculating their corresponding speeds of convergence and time 
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required for full(100%) convergence on the other hand, addresses quite a number important 
policy  issues  in  the  present  debate  over  timing  and  monetary  convergence  of  upcoming 
African single currency zones. To complement monetary policies, this paper also examines 
real  policy  convergence  in  terms  of   macroeconomic  performance(GDP growth)  and  per 
capita income growth.
2.1 Literature on the WAM and  EAM zones 
Literature pertaining  to the WAM and EAM zones could be classified into two main 
strands. While the first is dedicated to the later region, the second is focused on the former 
region. 
To the best of our knowledge only two empirical papers have been dedicated to the 
EAMZ.  Mkenda(2001)  employ  a  Generalized  Purchasing  Power  Parity(GPPP)  model  to 
analyze the suitability of the EAC(East African Community) for a single currency union. The 
results which indicate that the real exchange rates between the EAC countries are cointegrated 
during the period 1980-98, suggest that the EAMZ is an optimal currency area.  However as 
pointed–out by  Buigut & Valev(2005), the limitation of this approach is that movements in 
macroeconomic variables reflect the combined effects of shocks and responses(Angeloni & 
Dedola, 1999). Hence this methodology does not distinguish errors from responses. Buigut & 
Valev(2005) empirically assess the suitability of the East  African countries for a regional 
monetary union by testing for symmetry of the underlying structural shocks. Results suggest 
that  supply  and  demand  shocks  are  generally  asymmetric,  which  does  not  support   the 
forming of a single currency union. Buigut & Valev(2005) further stress that the speed and 
magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Thus, further integration of 
the economies could lead to more favorable conditions for a monetary union. 
Some studies have also focused on analyzing the feasibility of forming a monetary 
union in the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). Thus in the second 
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strand,  Celasun  & Justiniano(2005)  have  used  a  dynamic  factor  analysis  to  examine  the 
synchronization of output fluctuations among member countries. Their results indicate that 
small countries within ECOWAS experience relatively more synchronized output variations. 
Hence, they suggest that monetary unification among subsets of countries is preferable over 
wider  monetary  integration.  Debrun  et  al.  (2005)  investigate  the  potential  for  monetary 
integration in the ECOWAS using a model of monetary and fiscal policy interactions.  Their 
findings suggest that the proposed monetary union is desirable for most non-West African 
Economic and Monetary Union(WAEMU) countries but not for the exiting WAEMU member 
states. Tsangarides & Qureshi (2008) in applying hard and soft clustering algorithms to a set 
of variables suggested by the convergence criteria and the theory of optimal currency areas, 
examine the suitability of countries in the West African region to form the proposed monetary 
union(WAMZ). Findings reveals considerable dissimilarities in the economic characteristics 
of  member  countries.  Much recently,  Alagidede  et  al.(2011)  have  examined  the  inflation 
dynamics  and common  trends  in  the  real  domestic  product  in  candidate  countries  of  the 
embryonic  WAMZ.  Using  fractional  integration  and  cointegration  method,  they  establish 
significant heterogeneity among the countries. 
With much attention currently being placed on convergence criteria and preparedness 
of the aspiring member states,  this paper is inspired by the premise of the EMU crisis. Thus 
we  assess  if  candidate  countries  of  potential  African  monetary  zones  have  similar 
fundamental and structural characteristics for real and monetary policy convergence. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We examine a sample of  4 West and 5 East African countries with data from African 
Development Indicators(ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database(FDSD) 
of the World Bank. While openness(trade), inflation, population growth, public investment, 
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GDP growth and GDP per capita growth  indicators are obtained from the former source, 
financial  intermediary  dynamics  are  fetched  from the  later.  Owing to  constraints  in  data 
availability, our dataset spans from 1981 to 2009. Details on countries(Appendix 4), summary 
statistics(Appendix 1), correlation analysis(Appendix 2) and variable definitions(Appendix3) 
are in the appendices. The choice of variables is premised on two facts: (1) real economic 
sector policies are designed to achieve macroeconomic performance through growth in GDP 
at national and per capita income levels; (2) monetary policies are designed to keep inflation 
in  check and improve financial  intermediary dynamics  of  depth(money supply and liquid 
liabilities),  efficiency(at  banking and financial  levels),  activity(from banking and financial 
perspectives) and size. For organizational reasons, selected variables are classified into the 
following strands.
3.1.1 Financial variables 
a) Financial depth
Lining on recent finance literature(Asongu, 2011abcd) and the FDSD, we measure 
financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives with indicators 
of  broad  money  supply  (M2/GDP)  and  financial  system  deposits  (Fdgdp)  respectively. 
Whereas  the former denotes the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits the 
later  represents  liquid liabilities.  The premise  for distinguishing these aspects  of financial 
depth  is  the  fact  that  we  are  dealing  exclusively  with  developing  countries,  where-in  a 
significant chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector(Asongu, 
2011e). Both measures are in GDP ratios(see Appendix 3) and can robustly cross-check one 
another as either account for over 98% of variability in the other(see Appendix 2). 
b) Financial efficiency
In the context of this paper, financial intermediation efficiency neither refers to the 
production efficiency of decision making units nor to the profitability-oriented concept in the 
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banking industry.  What we aim at eliciting is the ability of banks to effectively meet their 
fundamental  role  of  transforming  mobilized   deposits  into  credit  for  economic  operators. 
Thus,  we employ  proxies  for  banking-system-efficiency  and  financial-system-efficiency 
(respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial 
system deposits: Fcfd’). Like with financial depth, these 2 intermediation efficiency proxies 
can cross-check each other as either reflects more than 92% of variability in the other (see 
Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
Lining on the FDSD we measure financial intermediary size as the ratio of “deposit 
bank assets” to the “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank 
assets: Dbacba). 
d) Financial activity
The concept of  financial intermediary  activity highlighted here is the ability of banks 
to  grant  credit  to  economic  operators.   In  order  to  ensure  robustness  we proxy for  both 
banking intermediary activity and financial intermediary activity with “private domestic credit 
by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: 
Pcrbof” respectively. The later measure cross-checks the former as it represents  more than 
95% of variability in the former (see Appendix 2).
3.1.2  Other  variables
Borrowing from the convergence literature we also measure the outcome of monetary 
policy with inflation(Bruno et al.,2011).  Macro economic performance is accounted for at 
macro  and  micro  levels  with  GDP  and  GDP  per  capita  growth  rates  respectively.  In 
accordance  with past  studies,  we control  for  control  for  openness,  public  investment  and 
population growth in the regressions(Pritchett, 1997; Bruno et al.,2011; Narayan et al., 2011). 
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In the literature on convergence of per capita incomes and the root of the convergence theory, 
an important clue is that per capita incomes of countries identical in structural characteristics 
such as preferences in technologies, rate of population growth and government policies have 
the  tendency  to  converge  to  one  another  if  the  countries  share  similar  fundamental 
characteristics(Prichett,  1997).  In  the  current  paper,  these  fundamental  conditions  are 
monetary and real policies. Hence we proxy for preferences in technology, population growth 
and government policy with openness(trade), population growth rate and public investment 
respectively.
3.2 Methodology
As underlined by  Fung(2009;3) the two equations below are the standard approaches 
in  the  literature  for  investigating  conditional  convergence  if   tiW ,  is  taken  as  strictly 
exogenous. 
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln( εξηδβ τττ ++++=− −−−       (1)
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln( εξηδσ ττ ++++= −−                       (2)
 Where σ = 1+ β, tiY ,  is the proxy for per capita financial  or real sector growth in country i at 
period  t.  tiW ,  is a vector of macroeconomic determinants(openness, public investment and 
population growth) of per capita finance(or real sector per capita),  iη  is a country specific 
effect,  tξ  is a time specific constant and  ti ,ε  an error term. In line with the exogenous 
growth model,  a  statistically  significant  negative  coefficient  on  β  in  Eq.  (1)  means  that 
countries  relatively  close  to  their  steady  state  of  per  capita   growth  will  experience  a 
slowdown in growth of the per capita banking(real sector) development, known as conditional 
convergence(Narayan et al.,2011;2).  Concurring with  Fung(2009;3), if  10 << σ in Eq.(2), 
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then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable around the path with a trend growth rate the same as that of 
tW , and with a height relative to the level of tW .  The variables contained in τ−tiW ,  and the 
individual effect iη  are indicators of the long-term level  the market(real sector) is converging 
to. Thus, the country specific effect  iη  highlights the existence of other determinants of a 
country’s steady state not captured by τ−tiW , .
Conditions for convergence elucidated above are conditional on the strict exogeneity 
of   tiW , . Unfortunately, this is not practical in the real world because,  whereas openness, 
public  investment  and  population  growth(components  of  tiW , )  influence  per  capita 
financial(real  sector)   development,  the  reverse  effect  cannot  be  ruled-out.  Thus  we  are 
confronted  with  an  issue  of  endogeneity   where  openness(trade),  public  investment  and 
population growth are correlated with the error term( ti ,ε ). More so country and time specific 
effects could be correlated with other variables in the model, which is often the case when 
lagged dependent variables are part of the equations.  A means of dealing with the problem of 
the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the lagged endogenous variables 
involves getting rid of the individual effect by first differencing. Thus Eq. (2) becomes:
)()()ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,, ττττττ εεδσ −−−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi WWYYYY                  (3)
Even  with  this  individual  fixed  effect  elimination,  modelling  by  Ordinary  Least 
Square(OLS)  is  still  biased  because  there  remains  a  correlation  between  the  lagged 
endogenous independent variable and the disturbance term. Arellano & Bond(1991) suggested 
an  application  of  the  Generalized  Method  of  Moments(GMM)  that  exploits  all  the 
orthogonality conditions between the endogenous retarded variables and the error term. This 
GMM approach has been extensively applied in the convergence literature; and recently used 
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by Narayan et al.(2011). While Narayan et al.(2011) use Eq.(1) without fixed effects, this 
paper  applies Eq.(3) instead; in accordance with the Fung(2009) definition. We prefer the 
second-step GMM  instead  of  the  first-step because  it  corrects  the  residuals  for 
heteroscedasticity.  This  is  because,  in  the  first-step  the  residuals  are  considered  to  be 
homoscedastic. The assumption of no auto-correlation in residuals is crucial as past lagged 
variables are to be used as instruments for the endogenous variables.  Also, the estimation 
depends  on  the  assumption  that  the  retarded  values  of  the  outcome  variable  and  other 
explaining variables are valid instruments in the regression. Assuming  the error terms of the 
level  equation  are  not  auto-correlated,  the  first-order  auto-correlation  of  the  differenced 
residuals should be significant  while their  second-order auto-correlation should not be the 
case. The validity of the instruments is assessed by the Sargan over-identifying restrictions 
test(OIR). 
As emphasized by Islam (1995;14),  annual time spans are too short to be appropriate 
for  studying  convergence,  as  short-term errors  may loom substantially  in  such brief  time 
spans. Therefore owing  to our data span of 28 years, we borrow from Narayan et al.(2011) in 
using a 2 year non-overlapping interval such that we have fourteen time intervals: 1980-1981; 
1982-1983 and so on. Thus, by implication in the  analysis, the autoregressive order τ is set to 
2. For robustness purposes we set τ set to 3 and then to 4 in a bid for consistency of results. 
We also assess the implied rate of convergence by computing (σ/2) which by virtue of 
Eqs. (1) and (2) is the equivalent of the  Narayan et al.(2011) computation with  (1+β)/2. Thus 
the paper divides the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable by 2 
because  we  have  used  a  two  year  non  overlapping  span  in  a  bid  to  absorb  short  term 
disturbances. When the absolute value of the estimated autoregressive coefficient is greater 
than  zero  but  less  than  one( 10 << σ ),  we  confirm  the  alternative  hypothesis  of 
convergence. A detail  interpretation suggests, past differences have less proportionate impact 
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on future differences, denoting the variation on the left hand side of Eq.(3) is diminishing 
overtime as the country is converging to a stable state. 
4. Empirical analysis 
This  section   probes  into  three  main  issues:  (1)  assessment  of  the  presence  of 
convergence ; (2) determination of the speed of convergence and; (3) computation of the time 
needed for  full(100%) convergence.  Table  1  presents  a  summary of  overall  findings  and 
addresses the first two concerns, while Table 2 and Table 3 respectively reveal results for 
unconditional and conditional convergence. 
In  assessing unconditional(absolute)  convergence  only the lagged difference  of the 
endogenous  variable  is  used  as   exogenous  variable  while  conditional  convergence  is  in 
respect of Eq. (3). It follows that unconditional convergence is estimated without tiW , : vector 
of determinants(openness, public investment and population growth) of per capita finance(or 
real sector per capita). In order to assess the validity of the model and correspondingly the 
convergence hypothesis, we carry-out two tests, namely the Sargan test which examines the 
over-identification of restrictions, and the Arrellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which 
assesses the null  hypothesis  of no autocorrelation.  The Sargan OIR test investigates if the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the estimated equation. Its null hypothesis 
is  the stance  that  the instruments  collectively  are   strictly exogenous(do not  suffer  from 
endogeneity),  which is needed for the validity of the GMM estimates.  We also report the 
Wald statistics for the collective significance of estimated coefficients.
 The Sargan, autocorrelation and Wald tests statistics with corresponding p-values for 
each of the panels are reported in the tables. The Sargan test statistics often appear with a p-
value greater than 0.10, hence its null hypothesis is not rejected for the majority of models. 
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Only results  for the AR(2) test  are  reported  because as  opposed to  the AR(1),  it 
detects autocorrelation in levels. For all estimated models we are unable to reject the AR(2) 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. There is therefore robust evidence that all the models 
are free from autocorrelation.  
4.1 Summary of results 
In Table 1, we provide a synthesis of results.  This summary is premised on details 
presented  in  Tables  2-3.  We  report  the  state  of  convergence  and  corresponding  speeds, 
respectively denoted in terms of AC(Absolute Convergence), CC(Conditional Convergence), 
SAC(Speed of  Absolute  Convergence)  and SCC(Speed of  Conditional  Convergence).  We 
notice that for the two panels, with regard to all real and monetary policy dynamics, only 
banking system efficiency within the EAMZ reflects AC. 
Table 1: Summary of results on convergence 
Financial   Depth
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
Financial Efficiency
Banking  System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ Yes(1%) No 28.90% --- No No --- ---
Financial   Activity
Banking System Activity Financial System Activity
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
Financial Size and Inflation
Financial Size Inflation(CPI)
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
Economic Performance  (GDP Growth)
GDP Growth GDP per capita Growth
AC CC SAC SCC AC CC SAC SCC
WAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
EAMZ No No --- --- No No --- ---
AC:  Absolute  Convergence.  CC:  Conditional  Convergence.  SAC :  Speed  of  Absolute  Convergence.  SCC:  Speed of  Conditional 
Convergence. WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary Zone. CPI: Consumer Price Index. 
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4.2 Results of absolute convergence
Table 2 below reports results of  AC regressions. On a first note, in all models, the 
instruments  are  valid  as  the  null  hypotheses  of  the  AR(2)  and Sargan-OIR tests  are  not 
rejected. Where the lagged endogenous estimated coefficient is significant, the corresponding 
Wald  statistics  is  also  significant.  This  was  not  unexpected  since  only  one  endogenous 
variable  is  employed  in  the  absolute  convergence  regressions:  implying  by definition  the 
statistics pertaining to the estimated coefficient is the same as the Wald statistics. We notice 
significant evidence of convergence only for the EAMZ in banking system efficiency. The 
speed of  this  AC is  28.90% per  annum(p.a)  and the time required to  achieve  full(100%) 
convergence is 6.92 years(yrs). 
Table 2: Absolute convergence
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial  Size
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities Banking   Efficiency Financial  Efficiency
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial 0.021 0.204 -0.729 0.147 -0.997 0.578*** -0.288 -0.022 0.117 0.814
(0.975) (0.718) (0.417) (0.812) (0.333) (0.000) (0.772) (0.932) (0.791) (0.241)
AR(2) -0.371 0.271 0.489 0.820 -0.455 0.853 -0.724 -0.051 0.734 0.047
(0.710) (0.786) (0.624) (0.412) (0.648) (0.393) (0.468) (0.959) (0.462) (0.962)
OIR 1.934 1.670 0.943 1.886 0.765 3.509 2.879 4.048 1.528 4.276
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Wald 0.000 0.130 0.657 0.056 0.933 41.52*** 0.083 0.007 0.069 1.370
(0.975) (0.718) (0.417) (0.812) (0.333) (0.000) (0.772) (0.932) (0.791) (0.241)
Countries 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5
Observations 50 56 50 56 51 63 50 56 51 60
Financial  Activity Inflation(CPI) Economic Performance
Banking  Activity Financial  Activity GDP  Growth GDPpc Growth
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial -1.059 0.168 -1.095 0.233 -1.670 0.577 -0.628 -1.384 0.484 0.107
(0.236) (0.653) (0.231) (0.506) (0.128) (0.343) (0.352) (0.107) (0.516) (0.924)
AR(2) 0.340 0.462 0.531 0.759 -0.968 0.494 -1.059 -1.515 1.003 0.030
(0.733) (0.644) (0.595) (0.447) (0.333) (0.621) (0.289) (0.129) (0.315) (0.975)
OIR 0.270 2.298 0.203 2.500 0.220 4.812 2.225 1.288 3.791 3.269
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.999)
Wald 1.399 0.201 1.429 0.441 2.315 0.897 0.865 2.598 0.421 0.009
(0.236) (0.653) (0.231) (0.506) (0.128) (0.343) (0.352) (0.107) (0.516) (0.924)
Countries 4 5 4 5 3 5 4 5 4 5
Observations 50 56 50 56 39 56 36 42 21 20
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively .  WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary 
Zone. Syst: System.  Initial: lagged autoregressive estimated coefficient.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions Sargan Test. Wald: statistics for joint significance of estimates. Obser: Observations. CPI: Consumer Price Index.  GDP: Gross  
Domestic Product. GDPpc : GDP per capita. 
4.3 Results of conditional convergence
Table 3 below presents  results of conditional convergence. We confirm the validity of 
the  models, as the instruments are valid since the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan-
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OIR tests are not rejected. Unfortunately we do not find any support for  CC in any monetary 
or real policy. Owing to constraints in  degrees of freedom requisite  for the OIR test, we use 
the macroeconomic conditioning information set( population growth, public investment and 
trade)  interchangeably   and  find  the  same  results;  details  of  which  are  presented  in  the 
following section.
Table 3: Conditional convergence
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial  Size
Money Supply Liquid Liabilities Banking   Efficiency Financial  Efficiency
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial -0.871 -0.809 -0.577 -0.784 -1.248 -0.115 -1.655 -1.582* -0.754 -0.707
(0.310) (0.417) (0.684) (0.401) (0.371) (0.812) (0.407) (0.083) (0.443) (0.388)
Intercept -0.127 0.132 -0.142 0.177 -0.011 0.132 -0.067 -0.022 -0.022 0.083**
(0.207) (0.340) (0.682) (0.332) (0.748) (0.261) (0.316) (0.448) (0.775) (0.034)
Trade -0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.009 0.004 0.0003 0.003 0.014 -0.004*** -0.002**
(0.106) (0.141) (0.538) (0.178) (0.526) (0.921) (0.345) (0.114) (0.000) (0.014)
Pop. Growth --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Pub. Investment --- -0.016 --- -0.021 --- -0.007 --- 0.003 --- -0.003
(0.337) (0.290) (0.762) (0.801) (0.579)
AR(2) 1.126 0.057 0.915 0.412 -0.618 1.079 -0.669 -1.655 0.226 0.949
(0.259) (0.953) (0.359) (0.680) (0.536) (0.280) (0.503) (0.097) (0.821) (0.342)
OIR 0.080 0.152 0.212 0.017 0.035 0.979 0.159 0.010 0.309 0.062
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Wald 2.818 4.323 0.480 3.189 0.799 0.564 0.953 3.065 16.52*** 14.02***
(0.244) (0.228) (0.786) (0.363) (0.670) (0.904) (0.620) (0.381) (0.000) (0.002)
Countries 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5
Observations 50 53 50 53 51 55 50 53 51 52
Financial  Activity Inflation(CPI) Economic Performance
Banking  Activity Financial  Activity GDP  Growth GDPpc Growth
WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ WAMZ EAMZ
Initial -1.020 -0.716 -1.064 -0.583 84.643 -0.535 -1.417* 1.325 0.621 -1.490
(0.337) (0.264) (0.324) (0.277) (0.626) (0.609) (0.080) (0.899) (0.212) (0.273)
Intercept 0.067 0.290 0.059 0.206 115.96 0.689 4.288 -0.365 -5.988 0.221
(0.848) (0.145) (0.839) (0.212) (0.618) (0.737) (0.275) (0.892) (0.286) (0.725)
Trade -0.002 0.014 -0.001 0.012 -1.124 0.017 0.013 0.259 -0.088 0.039
(0.522) (0.174) (0.600) (0.215) (0.622) (0.679) (0.731) (0.801) (0.619) (0.750)
Pop. Growth --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Pub. Investment --- -0.016 --- -0.008 --- 0.108** --- --- --- 0.277
(0.496) (0.708) (0.035) (0.262)
AR(2) 0.528 0.067 0.678 -0.059 0.427 0.405 0.879 -0.154 0.847 -1.196
(0.597) (0.946) (0.497) (0.952) (0.668) (0.685) (0.379) (0.877) (0.396) (0.231)
OIR 0.007 0.247 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.084 0.544 1.700 0.908 0.474
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Wald 1.546 2.081 1.572 1.931 0.929 7.731* 4.253 2.190 1.559 2.344
(0.461) (0.555) (0.455) (0.586) (0.628) (0.051) (0.119) (0.334) (0.458) (0.504)
Countries 4 5 4 5 3 5 4 5 4 5
Observations 50 53 50 53 39 49 36 41 21 18
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5%  and 1% respectively .  WAMZ: West African Monetary Zone. EAMZ: East African Monetary 
Zone. Syst: System.  Initial: lagged autoregressive estimated coefficient.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions Sargan Test. Wald: statistics for joint significance of estimates. Obser: Observations. CPI: Consumer Price Index.  GDP: Gross  
Domestic Product. GDPpc : GDP per capita. Pop: population. Pub: Public. 
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4.4 Robustness checks 
In a bid to assess the validity of our results we perform three types of robustness tests: 
(1)firstly,  for  every  regression(whether  in  AC  or  CC  terms)  we  use  the  conditioning 
information set singly and in pairs; (2) secondly, we  set τ  to 3 and replicate the same analysis 
in tables 2 and 3; (3) lastly, we set τ to 4 and still replicate the analysis. In so doing  we find 
results not significantly different from those in Tables 2-3. 
4.4.1 Setting τ to 3
When τ is set to 3 we notice no significantly different results from those in tables 2 
and 3. There is still evidence of AC in banking system efficiency within the EAMZ at a speed 
of 14.23%  per annum and time required to achieve a complete convergence of 21.08 years. 
No significant results are  noticed for the WAMZ.  We replicate the analysis with different 
pairs of the conditioning information set to further assess the robustness of the findings. 
4.4.1 Setting τ to 4
With τ  set to 4, the following new findings emerge. For the WAMZ there is evidence 
of AC in real sector policies; with  the speeds (time) of(for full) convergence in GDP and 
GDP per capita growths respectively: 12.57% p.a (31.82yrs) and 11.82% p.a (33.84yrs). The 
analysis is replicated with different pairs of the conditioning information set.
With regard to the EAMZ we find significant results only for financial depth. With 
respect to the money supply dimension, convergence is at 22.25% p.a with a full converge 
period  of  17.97yrs.  The  liquid  liability  dimension  of  financial  depth  has  a  convergence 
rate(  full  convergence  period)  of  21.45%  p.a(18.64yrs).  This  EAMZ   analysis  is  also 
replicated with different pairs of the conditioning information set.
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Overall,  even  after  all  available  combinations  of  τ(3  &  4)  and  alternating  macro 
economic variables, results are not substantially different from those summarized in Table 1 
and detailed in Tables 2-3. 
4.5  Discussion and policy implications
Before diving into the discussion of the results, it is imperative at the outset to grasp 
the economic intuition and circumstances motivating absolute and conditional convergence in 
real and monetary policies within the WAMZ and EAMZ. The  European  Monetary  Union 
(EMU) crisis has sent a strong signal to other common currency regions on the imperatives of 
real  and  monetary  convergence.  An   important  lesson  of  the  EMU crisis  is  that  serious 
disequilibria  result  from regional  monetary  arrangements  not  designed  to  be  robust  to  a 
variety  of  shocks(Willet,  2010;  Willett  &  Srisorn,  2011).  In  fashioning  the  euro  zone, 
institutions’  almost  exclusive  concern  was  placed  on limiting  crises  caused  by financial 
sectors. The official position of the German government today appears to maintain that failure 
of these safeguards is the principal cause of the crisis. 
Member countries of the potential WAMZ have twice postponed the take –off for the 
single currency.  Banking experts  in  the  up-coming EAMZ fear  that  plans  for  a  common 
currency in 2012 may be too ambitious as central banks in the five countries are given little  
time to prepare  for  the  monetary union.  In  a  recent  meeting  among EAMZ central  bank 
officials, experts have asserted the lack of knowledge in modeling and forecasting monetary 
policies as well as implementing reforms needed for a single currency union. In another recent 
meeting among elements of the WAMZ Convergence Council,  questions have been raised 
over the achievement of monetary policy convergence. Three issues have resulted from these 
stylized facts: (1) the need for monetary policy convergence; (2) the imperative of bankers to 
understand modeling and forecasting methods in monetary policy transmission and; (3) the 
requirement of common structural and institutional characteristics among candidate countries.
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In order to address the issues, the present analysis has been based on two hypotheses: 
(1)  real  economic  sector  policies  are  designed  to  achieve  macroeconomic  performance 
through growth in  GDP and GDP per  capita  at  macro  and micro  levels  respectively;  (2) 
monetary policies are designed to keep inflation in check and improve financial intermediary 
dynamics of depth(money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency(at banking and financial 
levels), activity(from banking and financial perspectives) and size. We have also calculated 
the speeds of convergence and period required to achieve full(100%) convergence;  where 
applicable.
4.5.1 Absolute convergence
Absolute  convergence  is  the  result  from  factors  such  as  monetary  zones  and  the 
adoption of a single currency, among others(Nayaran et al., 2011). Absolute convergence in 
real and monetary policy implies countries share the same fundamental characteristics with 
regard to the financial intermediary market such that the only difference across countries is in 
initial levels of financial intermediary market development. 
Since  the  mid  1980s  countries  of  the  WAM  and  EAM  zones  have  undertaken 
structural  reform  programs  engineered  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund(IMF)which 
include  financial  liberalization  for  the  most  part.  The  vested  agenda  has  been  to  reduce 
barriers  to  trade  and increase  foreign  investment.  Unlike  other  African  countries  without 
prospects for a single currency, the WAM and EAM zones member states are expected to 
benefit  more  in  the  reforms  by  virtue  of  reduced  risk  and  low  cross-border  currency 
conversion costs in the flows of trade and investments among member countries. Owing to 
this financial liberalization, capital controls and control on exchange rate transactions have 
been substantially eased in the WAM and EAM zones; together with advances in information 
and  communication  technologies  which  have  rendered  the  banking  industry  increasingly 
synchronized.  This  synchronization  has  also  increased  the  speed  of  shock  adjustment; 
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implying the rate at which one bank in the potential monetary zones adjusts when there is a 
shock  in  the  other  has  increased.  All  these  factors  should  naturally  result  in  absolute 
convergence.  However,  our  findings  do  not  reveal  support  for  absolute  convergence.  It 
follows that despite dissimilar initial levels in financial development, member states within 
the WAM and EAM zones do not share the same fundamental characteristics. In other words 
structural reform programs from the IMF and World Bank have not been  evenly implemented 
by candidate countries. 
4.5.2 Conditional convergence
According to the economic growth literature(Barro,  1991), conditional convergence 
depicts convergence whereby one’s own long-run stable state(equilibrium) is contingent on 
the different structural characteristics or fundamentals of each economy or market(Nayaran et 
al.,2011).  Still   from  Narayan  et  al.(2011),  when  financial  intermediary  markets  across 
countries differ in terms of factors relative to the performance of their markets, there could be 
conditional convergence. The convergence in dynamics of the banking sector is contingent on 
proxies which we observe and empirically model.  Our results are thus  conditional on the 
macroeconomic  measures  we have used.  Note should be taken of the fact  that,  owing to 
constraints in data availability and degrees of freedom required for the OIR-Sargan test, we 
conditioned our analysis to three macroeconomic variables: consistent with the convergence 
literature(Prichett,1997;  Bruno  et  al.,2011;  Narayan  et  al.,2011).  As we  have  found  no 
evidence  for  this  form  of  convergence,  it  follows  that  structural  characteristics  like 
macroeconomic  policies   are  different  across  countries.  Also,  based  on  stylized  facts 
presented in the motivation of the paper, it could be established  that this  insignificance is 
also the result  of cross-country differences  in  institutional  characteristics  like government 
quality(democracy,  control of corruption,  voice and accountability,  rule  of law, regulation 
quality, political stability…etc).  
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On a final note the findings of this paper are broadly consistent with the convergence 
literature  on the EAMZ(Mkenda,2001; Buigut  & Valev,2005) and the WAMZ(Celasun & 
Justiniano,2005; Debrun et al., 2005; Tsangarides & Qureshi, 2008; Alagidede et al.,2011). 
 
4.5.3 Policy implications 
In spite of common fundamental characteristics for candidate countries of the WAM 
and  EAM  zones(as  they  are  implementing  common  policies  in  the  run-up  to  the  new 
monetary zones), we have found substantial insignificance in both types of convergence in the 
analyses.  These findings  have four broad implications:  (1) initial  conditions  for financial 
development  are  different  across  countries;  (2)  fundamental  characteristics  as  common 
monetary  policy  initiatives  and  IMF  backed  financial  reform  programs  are  implemented 
differently across countries; (3) there is remarkable evidence of cross-country variations in 
structural  characteristics  of  macroeconomic  performance;  (4)  institutional  cross-country 
differences could also be responsible for the deficiency in convergence within the potential 
monetary zones. 
As  a  policy  implication,  heterogeneous  structural  and  institutional  characteristics 
across  countries  are  giving  rise  to  different  levels  and  patterns  of  financial  intermediary 
development.  Thus  member  states  should  work  towards  harmonizing  cross-country 
differences  in  structural  and  institutional  characteristics  that  hamper  the  effectiveness  of 
convergence in monetary and real policies.
5. Conclusion 
A  spectre  is  hunting  embryonic  African  monetary  zones:  the  EMU  crisis.  The 
introduction of common currencies in  West and East Africa is facing stiff challenges in the 
timing of monetary convergence, the imperative of bankers to apply common modeling and 
forecasting methods of monetary policy transmission, as well as the requirements of common 
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structural and institutional characteristics among candidate states. Inspired by the premise of 
the EMU crisis,  this  paper has assessed real  and monetary policy convergence within the 
potential  WAM  and  EAM  zones.  In  the  analysis,  monetary  policy  targets  inflation  and 
financial  dynamics  of  depth,  efficiency,  activity  and  size  while  real  sector  policy  targets 
economic performance in terms of GDP growth at macro and micro levels. Findings suggest 
overwhelming lack of convergence; an indication that candidate countries still have to work 
towards harmonizing cross-country differences in  fundamental,  structural and institutional 
characteristics that hamper the convergence process.
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Appendices 
  Appendix 1: Summary statistics(Combined data for WAMZ and EAMZ)
Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations
Financial Depth Money Supply 0.223 0.114 0.054 0.747 125
Liquid Liabilities 0.161 0.102 0.028 0.553 125
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking  Efficiency 0.651 0.315 0.070 1.844 132
Financial  Efficiency 0.730 0.362 0.139 1.968 125
Financial 
Activity 
Banking  Activity 0.103 0.069 0.013 0.255 125
Financial  Activity 0.118 0.086 0.013 0.349 125
Financial  Size Financial  Size 0.563 0.242 0.054 1.155 130
Other Variables Openness(Trade) 54.581 26.818 6.320 138.76 129
Inflation 17.434 27.228 -100.00 196.12 120
Public Investment 7.180 3.719 0.000 15.734 106
GDP growth 3.584 6.759 -50.248 27.462 128
GDP per capita growth 0.752 6.200 -46.892 22.618 128
Population  growth 2.747 1.606 -6.849 10.043 135
S.D: Standard Deviation.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product
Appendix 2: Correlation analysis(Combined data for WAMZ and EAMZ)
Fin.  Depth Fin. Efficiency Fin. Activity F. Size Other Variables
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Trade Infl. Pub. I GDPg GDPpcg Popg
1.000 0.983 0.078 0.014 0.790 0.788 0.532 0.460 -0.210 -0.159 -0.010 -0.048 0.119 M2
1.000 0.084 0.005 0.810 0.823 0.567 0.406 -0.208 -0.238 0.020 -0.019 0.126 Fdgdp
1.000 0.920 0.590 0.565 0.394 0.162 -0.140 0.319 -0.062 -0.074 0.155 BcBd
1.000 0.473 0.503 0.367 0.035 -0.189 0.434 -0.163 -0.169 0.002 FcFd
1.000 0.955 0.683 0.420 -0.219 -0.074 -0.049 -0.083 0.100 Pcrb
1.000 0.640 0.301 -0.209 -0.105 -0.073 -0.108 0.101 Pcrbof
1.000 0.292 -0.258 0.043 0.087 0.051 0.174 Dbacba
1.000 -0.127 0.137 0.008 -0.017 0.084 Trade
1.000 -0.031 0.290 0.267 0.240 Infl.
1.000 0.025 0.021 0.057 Pub.I
1.000 0.973 0.509 GDPg
1.000 0.301 GDPpcg
1.000 Popg
M2 :Money Supply. Fdgdp : Liquid liabilities. BcBd : Bank credit on Bank deposit. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposit. Prcb:Private 
domestic credit by deposit banks. Prcbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank 
assets  on  deposit  bank  assets  plus  central  bank assets.  Pub.I:  Public  Investment.  GDPg:  GDP growth.  Popg:  Population  growth.  Fin: 
Financial. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources
Inflation Infl. Consumer Price (Annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Openness Trade Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP
World Bank(WDI)
Public  Investment PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
 GDP Growtth GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI)
GDP per capita Growth GDPpcg Average annual GDP per capita growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Population Growth Popg Annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Economic financial 
depth(Money Supply)
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and 
time deposits(% of GDP)
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
depth(Liquid liabilities)
Fdgdp Financial system deposits(% of GDP)  World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system 
allocation efficiency
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system 
allocation efficiency
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits 
World Bank(FDSD)
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions(% of GDP)
World Bank(FDSD)
Financial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central banks assets 
plus deposit bank assets
World Bank(FDSD)
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits.  
Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit  
bank assets on Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database. 
Appendix 4: Presentation of countries 
Zones Definitions Countries Number
WAMZ West African Monetary Zone The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea*, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 4
EAMZ East African Monetary Zone Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Uganda. 5
*Guinea is not included in the WAMZ Analysis owing to constraints in data availability. 
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